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CEO Pay and Layoffs

Do CEOs

Whether CEO pay is linked with
job loss or mass layoffs is not
really a new question. In fact, I
first started thinking about this
nearly 20 years ago when I was in
graduate school. I saw a provocative press release headlined “CEOs
Win, Workers Lose” (Institute for
Policy Studies, 1994). The piece listed the companies with
the largest number of layoffs at that time and also listed
the raises for their CEOs. The average raise for the CEOs
was more than 30 percent; the report and others who took
up its findings seemed to suggest that the layoffs caused
the raises.
The implied causation intrigued me, so I figured I’d look a
little deeper into the connection between CEO pay and mass
layoffs. The first thing I did was calculate the median raise
of those several dozen CEOs. This revealed that although
the mean raise was 30 percent, the median was nearly identical to the 11 percent median increase for all CEOs of the
top 800 U.S. publicly traded companies that year, regardless
of whether their companies experienced layoffs.
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My next step was to collect more data — a lot more data.
The study that got me started, and raised very interesting
issues about job loss and compensation, looked at CEOs
at a few dozen companies over one year. I collected data
from about 1,000 firms over seven years. Finding the CEO
pay data for publicly traded companies was easy; collecting
detailed information on employee layoffs was not (and
required combing through many thousands of indexed
newspaper accounts).
I added to the salary and layoff data a bunch of information on CEO characteristics (e.g., age and seniority) and
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company characteristics (e.g., size, shareholder returns and market value). I then
used some standard statistical techniques
to probe the relationship between layoff
announcements and CEO pay more carefully. The original results are reported in
Kevin F. Hallock, “CEO Pay, Layoffs and
Firm Performance,” American Economic
Review, September 1998).
Separating companies into those that
made a layoff announcement in the
previous year and those that didn’t,
you will find that the CEOs who made
at least one large layoff the previous
year make a lot more (about 40 percent
in cash pay) than those who made no
layoffs in the previous year. But, once
one starts controlling for company and CEO attributes,
essentially subdividing companies and their CEOs by other
characteristics (like company size and CEO seniority), the
findings change quickly. For example, we all know that
bigger firms pay CEOs more (Kevin F. Hallock, “The Relationship Between Company Size and CEO Pay,” workspan,
February 2011). It also turns out that, among publicly traded
companies, bigger firms are more likely to have layoffs.
So once we control for just the market value of the firm
(or the number of employees, or assets — it doesn’t really
matter), those CEOs leading firms that announced a layoff
the previous year only make about 12 percent more than
those who did not. And, after controlling for lots of other
things (e.g., CEO age and experience, firm industry, stock
returns and the like), there was absolutely no relationship
between layoffs and CEO (cash) pay or pay raises.
But, isn’t a lot of CEO pay wrapped up in stock and stock
options? What about that?

and Kevin F. Hallock, “The Changing
Relationship Between Job Loss Announcements and Stock Prices: 1970 –1999,”
Labour Economics, 2009, and in Kevin F.
Hallock, “Job Loss and the Fraying of the
Implicit Employment Contract,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Fall 2009).
What we found was a notable shift
between the 1970s and 2000s in the reaction
of the stock market to layoff announcements. Specifically, the stock price reaction
to layoffs was negative in the 1970s and
became increasingly less so (on average)
over 40 years when it ended most recently,
weakly positive in the 2000s. We reasoned
that in the 1970s layoff announcements
would be met with immediate stock price
declines (example: deficient demand in the U.S. automobile
market at the time), and in the 2000s, layoffs might be met with
stock price increases (example: efficiency and belt-tightening).
In fact, we found evidence of just that.

... the CEOs
who made
at least one large
layoff the previous
year make a lot more
than those who made
no layoffs in the
previous year. But ...

But What About All of the Stock and Options?
We all know that for any publicly traded companies in the
United States, CEOs are not only frequently granted stock
and stock options, but they can also hold considerable
equity in their firms. So the natural next step would be to
consider whether the stock market reacts to announcements
of layoffs. Even if there is no relationship between CEO
current pay and layoffs, if the stock market reacts positively
or negatively to layoff announcements, there still could be
substantial material effects on CEO wealth. I investigated this
in a number of papers, including the one mentioned previously, a more recent one with Henry Farber (Henry S. Farber

What About CEO Firings?
Some ask: But don’t the CEOs get fired, too? Sometimes. In
an additional paper with Sherrilyn Billger (Sherrilyn M. Billger
and Kevin F. Hallock, “Mass Layoffs and CEO Turnover,”
Industrial Relations, July 2005), we investigated the link
between CEO turnover, mass layoffs and stock prices. Among
our findings are that mass layoffs in firms are significantly
related to CEO turnover the following year and, in some
time periods, layoffs are strongly related to CEO turnover
two years later. We also found that if the stock market reacts
positively to a layoff announcement, the CEO is likely to stay
on for some time. However, if the stock market responds
negatively to the layoff announcement, the CEO is, before too
long, also much more likely to exit the company.
As the U.S. labor market continues its slow climb out of the
doldrums, how CEOs, other employees and firms fare after
employee layoffs will continue to be an interesting topic,
and there is a lot more interesting research to be done.
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The Institute for Compensation Studies (ICS) at Cornell University
analyzes, teaches and communicates about monetary and nonmonetary rewards from work, and how rewards influence individuals,
companies, industries and economies. ICS research and leading-edge insight
address compensation issues challenging employers and employees in today’s
dynamic global marketplace. www.ilr.cornell.edu/ics
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